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THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF AND THE
GLOBAL PREVENTION OF TERRORISM:
A ROLE FOR CONDITIONALITIES
Olivera Medenica*
I. INTRODUCTION

T

he Twin Towers, an architectural symbol of Western
power, came crashing down on a beautiful and hopelessly
tragic September morning. The incredible scale of the attack
left us horrified, bewildered, and wounded as a nation. With
ghastly images in our memory, the U.S. turned towards the
bleak prospect of fighting an elusive enemy. Like any true economic and military superpower, our response was strong and
immediate. But was our response efficient, and most importantly, are we safer now than before?
In an interview granted shortly after September 11, 2001,
James Wolfhenson, the president of the World Bank, described
the collapse of the Twin Towers as not only a terrorist attack of
the grandest scale, but also as the image “of the South landing
hard on the cradle of the North.”1 This statement is insightful
because it is powerfully descriptive and suggests that a collective response is needed to address the issue. Although poverty
may not be the sole cause of terrorism, it does play a role in its
spread.2 If that is the case, ignoring such a connection is not
only negligent, but as has been proven, deadly.
* J.D. Brooklyn Law School, New York, 2000; B.M. Manhattan School of
Music, 1996. Ms. Medenica is a partner at Wahab Riveles & Medenica, and is
currently teaching Legal Writing for the International Moot Court program at
Brooklyn Law School. The author would particularly like to thank Judge
Evan J. Wallach, Professor Claire Kelly, Kaiser Wahab and Leo Balk for taking the time to read her article and provide helpful comments and edits.
1
Maurizio Molinari, Wolfensohn: La Guerra al Terrorismo Si Vince Eliminado
la Povertà “L’11 Settembre È Come Se L’afghanistan Fosse Sbarcato A Wall
Street Da Allora Non Possiamo Più Ignorare I Problemi Del Sud Del Mondo”
[The War Against Terrorism Will Be Won By Eliminating Poverty – “September 11 is as if Afghanistan Landed on Wall Street; Since Then, We Can No
Longer Ignore the Problem of the South”], LA STAMPA, Dec. 12, 2001, at 5,
available at http://digilander.libero.it/liceorodolico/guerra/Wolfensohn.htm.
2. Powell: Poverty Aids Terrorism, CNN MONEY, Feb. 1, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/02/01/news/davos_powell/index/htm.
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This Article argues that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), collectively the International
Financial Institutions (“IFIs”), could play a central role in the
war on terrorism. As international institutions with unrivaled
resources at their disposal, both the World Bank and the IMF
could begin incorporating broad anti-terrorism conditions
within their financial assistance programs.3 The IFIs could expand beyond their respective mandates and impose conditions
that would require states seeking financial assistance to implement an anti-terrorism framework designed to criminalize
terrorist offenses, prevent potential terrorists and terrorist
groups from using such states’ territory to further terrorist purposes, and allow for the exchange of information with the necessary international authorities concerning the activities and
crimes of terrorists and terrorist groups. In return, the funds
provided by the IFIs could assist these states in strengthening
their economies and ameliorating prevalent levels of poverty.
Part II of this Article analyzes different definitions of terrorism and examines the leading factors contributing to its rise.
Part III.A provides an historical and technical outline of the
IFIs’ respective mandates and activities from their inception at
the Bretton Woods conference to their current activities. Part
III.B posits a new role for the IFIs and concludes that these institutions should expand their respective mandates by providing financial assistance to address the leading factors contributing to the spread of terrorism and conditioning such assistance
on the fulfillment of the objectives contained within United Nations (“UN”) Resolution 1373.4
II . TERRORISM
Terrorism, as an act of political violence, has existed for as
long as political ideologies have been promoted.5 In the wake of
th
September 11 , the subject of terrorism has become a common

3. Although the IFIs have begun to address the issue of terrorism, the
institutions’ work has not been included as a condition for financial assistance
and it has been limited to financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering
issues.
4. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Mtg., Supp. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001).
5. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 14–15 (1998).
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staple of our daily news intake. But aside from religious fanaticism, scant attention has been paid to economic and social factors underlying the proliferation of this dreadful phenomenon.
To fully understand terrorism, attention must shift from the
criminal nature of the act to a perception of terrorism as a
symptom of our social pathology. The following section will
therefore explore the root causes of terrorism: first, through an
examination of the various definitions of the term, and second,
through an analysis of the key factors leading to or facilitating
the development of this sociopolitical disease.
A. Definitions of Terrorism
Although the word “terrorist” has become a part of our everyday vocabulary, no single definition of the term has gained universal acceptance within the international community.6 This
lack of consensus stems from the inherently pejorative nature of
the term.7 It is a word loaded with negative connotations that
are generally only applicable to one’s adversaries.8 As Brian
Jenkins writes “[w]hat is called terrorism…seems to depend on
one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment;
and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its
opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its
moral viewpoint.”9 This proclivity for subjective judgment has
spawned a great variety of definitions, each reflecting the political slant of the particular interest group.10 Title 22 of the U.S.
Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”11
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or

6. HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 37; see also ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL
TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASES AND
LITERATURE 6 (1983).
7. HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 31.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 38.
11. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2000).
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social objectives.”12 The U.S. Department of Defense defines it
as “the unlawful use of — or threatened use of — force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or
ideological objectives.”13
Each one of these examples partially defines terrorism. The
first leaves out spontaneous acts of political violence along with
the psychological dimension of terrorism.14 The second offers no
insight as to what political or ideological aims might entail, and
the third, although most complete, omits the social dimension of
terrorism.15
As explained by Bruce Hoffman, perhaps the best explanation
of the term lies in its distinction from other types of violence.16
When contrasted with guerrilla warfare, ordinary criminals and
the lunatic assassin, terrorism can be understood as:
Ineluctably political in aims and motives;
Violent — or, equally important, threaten[ed] violence;
Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions
beyond the immediate victim or target;
Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members
wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and
Perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.17

Taking these elements into account, and for purposes of this
Article, terrorism will be defined “as the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in
the pursuit of political change.”18
12. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (West 2004); see also FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES:
COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT AND WARNING UNIT, NATIONAL
SECURITY DIVISION i (1998), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/
terror98.pdf.
13. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Chapter 3, Department
of the Army FM 100-20/APF3-20 (Dec. 5, 1990), available at http://www.maoism.org/misc/lic/fm100-20/10020ch3.htm#s_25.
14. See HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 38–39.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id.
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B. State Failure
The argument is often made that poverty causes terrorism.19
Drawing such an equation merely provides an adumbrated explanation of the problem. It is well-known that Osama bin
Laden, the alleged mastermind of worldwide Islamic terrorism,
originates from great Saudi wealth.20 It is also fairly well
th
known that most if not all of the September 11 hijackers were
highly educated and received money from their families.21 But
even if there is no direct correlation between poverty and terrorism, there is some validity in recognizing the connection.22 Pov-

19. See Alan Friedman, UN Leader To Warn of Dangers in Wealth Gap,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 4, 2002, at 1; Charles Lambroschini, Guerre Contre le
Terrorisme – Dans Un Entretien Au “Figaro”, Le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies Souligne Que La Démocratie Est Une Valeur Universelle; Kofi
Annan: “Il Faut S’attaquer Aux Raciness Du Terrorisme, La Pauvreté Et
L’ignorance” [War Against Terrorism: In an Interview with “Figaro” the Secretary General of the UN Stresses That Democracy Is a Universal Value: Kofi
Annan: “We Must Address The Roots of Terrorism, Poverty and Ignorance”], LE
FIGARO, Nov. 5, 2001 at 4; Swami Agnivesh & Rev Valson Thampu, Poverty
and Terrorism: Shared Roots (Jan. 12, 2002), available at http://www.tehelka.
com/channels/commetary/2002/jan/12/com011202poverty.htm; Andrew Demaria, Arroyo Links Terrorism to Poverty, CNN.com at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/29/phili.arroyo (last visited Oct. 30, 2003);
Jim Lobe, US Report Links Terrorism with Rights, Poverty, ASIA TIMES, Mar.
6, 2002 available at http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DC06Ag03.html; Kuldip
Nayar, Terrorism: Rooted in Poverty, BUS. LINE, Sept. 14, 2001, available at
http://www.blonnet.com/businessline/2001/09/14/stories/04148503.htm; Powell: Poverty Aids Terrorism, CNN MONEY, Feb. 1. 2002 at http://money.cnn.
com/2002/02/ 01/news/davos_powell/index.htm.
20. George A. Lyden, The International Money Laundering Abatement and
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While Giving Money Laundering Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
201, 238–39 (2003) (“Bin Laden’s personal fortune has been estimated to be as
high as $300 million.”); Juliette Bennett, Public Private Partnerships: The
Role of the Private Sector in Preventing Funding Conflict, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 711, 711–12 (2002) (“Bin Laden’s reportedly vast inherited
wealth comes from his father’s hugely successful international construction
company.”).
21. Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 315, 321 (2003); Peter Finn, Hijackers Depicted as Elite Group: European Officials See Greater Sophistication, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at A01.
22. Friedman, supra note 19 (quoting both U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s and Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan’s recognition that terrorism flourishes in impoverished countries); Demaria, supra note 19 (quoting
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as stating, “[i]t is evil that
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erty may not be the cause of terrorism, but terrorists can manipulate poverty to their advantage.
As Robert Rotberg notes, an alternative and more probable
explanation to the poverty-terrorism synergy lies in the phenomena of failed states.23 According to Rotberg, “[b]ecause
failed states are hospitable to and harbor nonstate actors —
warlords and terrorists — understanding the dynamics of nation-state failure is central to the war against terrorism.”24 How
best to prevent state failure and strengthen weak states therefore becomes a critical component of any meaningful policy debate about terrorism prevention.
So what is state failure, and how does a state become a failing
or failed state? As Rotberg states, “[n]ation-states fail because
they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people.”25 He distinguishes
between several incremental stages of nation-state failure: general weakness or apparent distress, failure, and collapse.26 The
extent to which a state performs well on the success-failure
spectrum hinges on its capacity to deliver political goods to its
citizens.27 These political goods “encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and
ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions.”28
Although each political good carries great weight, there is a
hierarchy of political goods.29 None is as crucial as a state’s ob-

causes terrorism but the evil needs to spread its ideology as a mass base and
the best breeding ground is poverty”).
23. See generally STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) [hereinafter ROTBERG, IN A TIME OF TERROR];
Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WASH. Q. 85,
2002 [hereinafter Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure]; Robert I.
Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, 81 FOREIGN AFF. July-Aug. 2002
[hereinafter Rotberg, Failed States].
24. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, supra note 23, at 85.
25. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes
and Indicators in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 1
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) [hereinafter Rotberg, Causes and Indicators].
26. Id.
27. See id. at 1–2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
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ligation to provide security to its citizenry; a state must be able
to control its borders within and without.30 It must not only
have the capacity to prevent cross-border invasions, but it must
also provide its citizens the opportunity to resolve disputes
without recourse to arms.31 Once security has been sustained,
the delivery of other political goods becomes possible.32
A state must also provide a predictable and recognizable system of adjudicating disputes.33 It must regulate and protect the
rights of its citizens by establishing codes and procedures, as
well as a judicial system that effectively symbolizes and validates the local principles of justice and fair play.34
Another important political good is the right of citizens to liberally participate and contribute to the political process. This
includes: “the right to compete for office; respect and support for
national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and
courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental
civil and human rights.”35
Other remaining goods that similarly play an essential role in
the development of a healthy, or successful, state include:
[M]edical and health care (at varying levels and costs); schools
and educational instruction (of various kinds and levels) — the
knowledge good; roads, railways, harbors, and other physical
infrastructures — the arteries of commerce; communications
infrastructures; a money and banking system, usually presided over by a central bank and lubricated by a national currency; a beneficent fiscal and institutional context within
which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals and
potentially prosper; the promotion of civil society; and methods
of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons.36

Whether a state is categorized as weak, strong, or failed will
not depend on its success or failure to deliver a particular good,
but rather on its overall performance in the hierarchy of political goods.37 Strong states will undoubtedly perform well in all of
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
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the categories.38 Weak states, however, will provide a sporadic
and inconsistent performance, fulfilling some or few of the political good categories.39 The fewer categories a state is capable
of fulfilling, the more it tends to edge towards the brink of failure.40
In contrast, failed states deliver limited quantities, if any, of
essential political goods.41 They are deeply conflicted, divided by
civil wars or disobedience, and are generally typified by weak
institutions and a corrupt leadership.42 According to Rotberg,
failed states share the following characteristics:
[A] rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over
their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural
hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion;
high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of
regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per
capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for nonnational currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation.43

Because failed states are unable or unwilling to deliver key
political goods, they are vulnerable to attacks upon their fundamental legitimacy.44 When a self-serving ruling elite is perceived as working for itself and not the state, citizens begin to
seek alternative sectional and community loyalties.45 Group
leaders or communal warlords, some deriving support from outside sources, answer this demand for support and security.46 It
is at this stage that terror is likely to breed.47
In the final stages of failure, a state becomes truly collapsed.48
Although a rare and extreme case, the collapsed state is typified
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 6.
See id. at 5–6, 8.
Rotberg, Failed States supra note 23, at 132.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
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by a clear power vacuum.49 The state becomes a geographic expression of meaningless borders.50 In this state of deconstruction, warlords or local group leaders take over and install their
version of statehood by setting up local security, markets and
trading arrangements.51
The relative successes and failures of states operate on a
broad continuum, and no particular stage is terminal or permanent. The international community’s ability to recognize a
state’s slide into failure is crucial in light of a failed state’s vulnerability as a breeding ground for terrorism. But mere recognition of these warning signs, although a feat by itself, is insufficient to produce positive change. The international community must be ready to react, and to this end, it must be ready to
commit time, energy and most importantly, resources to help
prevent a state’s slide into failure.
III. A NEW ROLE FOR THE IFIS
Although few may disagree that terrorism must be addressed
on a global scale, questions remain as to how the international
community should achieve such an objective.52 A meaningful
response must be three dimensional. It must address the root
causes of the problem, provide a regulatory framework to prevent future infractions and ensure compliance through an effective enforcement mechanism. The following section will examine a possible role for the IMF and the World Bank, first
through a brief overview of the IFIs’ respective fields of operation and the extent to which these institutions’ policies and
lending facilities have evolved over time; and second, through
an analysis of loan conditions and their potential meaning in
the war against terrorism.
A. The IMF and World Bank
The IMF and the World Bank were created out of coordinated
efforts by the major Allied governments to revive international
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 133–34.
52. See discussion, infra, at Part II.A. See Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism
Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different Approaches, 8 NEW ENG. INT’L &
COMP. L. ANN. 215, 220–21 (2002).
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trade in the post-World War II era.53 The sharp economic downturn of the Great Depression and the military investment, both
human and economic, of World War II had left the global economy in severe need of a panacea for its fiscal ailments.54
In 1944, representatives of 45 governments met at the UN
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, in order to finance the rebuilding of a war-torn
Europe and to prevent future economic depressions.55 The consensus was to emphasize transnational commerce by building a
system supported by cooperation and interdependence in the
fields of trade and monetary policy.56 Out of this agreement
emerged the IMF and the World Bank.57
1. The Institutional Organization of the IMF
The IMF was created as a specialized agency of the UN designed to promote the stability of the international monetary
system.58 Its central objective is to prevent economic crises from
occurring by advising member states on the soundness of their
economic policies and to provide temporary financing for member states experiencing balance of payments problems.59
53. Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment
and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 164 (1998).
54. See Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 164. See generally International
Monetary Fund, What is the International Monetary Fund, at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
What is the IMF?].
55. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 11 (2002).
See also What is the IMF?, supra note 54.
56. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 164.
57. Id.; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 11.
58. What is the IMF?, supra note 54.
59. See id. Benefiting from an almost global membership of 183 states, the
IMF reports to the ministries of finance and the central banks of governments
of its member states. See id.; STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 12. A Board of Governors, representing all member states, is the highest authority within the
institution and meets once a year to decide on major policy issues. See What
is the IMF?, supra note 54. Day-to-day operations are left to the Executive
Board which meets several times per week at the IMF’s headquarters in
Washington, D.C. See id. The Executive Board consists of a total of 24 Executive Directors with the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, having their own seats on the Board,
and the remaining directors elected on a rotating two-year basis. See id. Decisions are made based on a weighted voting system with the state with the
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The IMF’s statutory purposes are embodied in its Articles of
Agreement.60 Its purposes include the promotion of balanced
world trade expansion, exchange rate stability, the establishment of a multilateral system of payments, and temporary financial assistance to member states experiencing balance of
payment problems.61 To further its goals, the IMF examines the

larger “quota” having more votes. See id. These quotas are essentially capital
subscriptions that members pay upon joining the institution and are intended
to reflect each member’s relative size in the global economy. See id. As quotas are determined by the economic size of a country, it is the major developed
countries that benefit from greater voting powers. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at
12. As a result of this, the United States benefits from an actual veto power.
Id.
60. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for
signature Dec. 27, 1945, 160 Stat. 1401, as amended April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T.
2203, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement].
61. Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund provides:
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to
the development of the productive resources of all members as
primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions between members
and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which
hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
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performance of each member’s economy as a whole, focusing
mainly on its macroeconomic policies — policies on exchange
rates, the management of money, and the member state’s government budget — and financial sector policies.62 The IMF also
places due consideration on a member state’s structural policies, such as labor market policies, that could potentially affect
macroeconomic performance.63 Additionally, the institution advises its members on the best course of action in re-evaluating
national policies so they more effectively pursue objectives such
as high employment, low inflation, and sustainable economic
growth.64 This technical assistance is further supplemented
with training programs for government and central bank officials of member states.65
An important aspect of the institution’s organization is its
ability to provide loans to member states experiencing balance
of payment problems. Maintaining a healthy balance is a central precondition to the IMF’s founding purpose of promoting
global economic stability.66 Should a member state find itself
unable to comply with this condition, Article I of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement provides that it is required to make funds
“temporarily available to [member states] under adequate safeguards…to correct maladjustments in their balance-ofpayments without resorting to measures destructive of national
or international prosperity.”67

(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and
lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances
of payments of members.
The IMF shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set
forth in this Article. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 1, 29
U.S.T. at 2205, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40, available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
62. What is the IMF?, supra note 54; IMF Articles of Agreement, supra
note 60, art. I, para. v, 29 U.S.T. at 2203, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
63. What is the IMF?, supra note 54.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. I, para. v, 29 U.S.T. at
2203, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
67. Id.
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The institution’s lending, however, is conditional on the borrowing state’s adoption of IMF policies designed to correct its
balance of payments problems.68 Article V(3)(a) of the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement provides that
[t]he Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources… and may adopt special policies for special balance of
payments problems, that will assist members to solve their
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate
safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of
the Fund.69

These performance-based conditionalities enable the IMF to
“independently…examine [the] country’s need for balance of
payments assistance and to require the adoption of corrective
policies before funds are disbursed.”70 Conditions may include
trade liberalization measures, depreciation of the exchange
rate, decreasing the fiscal deficit, and restrictions on the credit
provided by domestic banks.71 According to the IMF, “[t]he conditionality associated with IMF lending helps to ensure that by
borrowing from the IMF, a country does not just postpone hard
choices and accumulate more debt, but is able to strengthen its
economy and repay the loan.”72
68. What is the IMF?, supra note 54.
69. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. V sec. 3(a), 29 U.S.T. at
2211, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
70. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 166; see also International Monetary
Fund, Regulation of International Finance: Guidelines on Conditionality, Executive Board Decision No. 6056-(79/88), 1 B.D.I.E.L. 391 (Mar. 2, 1979).
71. Mary C. Tsai, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1317, 1321 (2000).
72. What is the IMF?, supra note 54. The IMF provides for various preventative and protective measures to ensure that the borrowing member state
has fulfilled the loan’s conditionalities. Compliance is established where the
borrowing state has satisfied certain criteria “designed to measure the impact
of fiscal and monetary policy on external viability.” Swaminathan, supra note
53, at 166. The institution’s standards for determining the borrowing member
state’s compliance “will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables,
and (ii) those [criteria] necessary to implement specific provisions of the Articles or policies adopted under them. Performance criteria may relate to other
variables only in exceptional cases….” International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Decision No. 6056-(79/38), 1.B.D.I.E.L. 393 (Mar. 2, 1979), reprinted in JOSEPH GOLD, CONDITIONALITY 30 (International Monetary Fund,
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2. The Institutional Organization of the World Bank
The World Bank is a multilateral institution that enables
member states to assist in the collective “promotion, worldwide, of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction.”73 These objectives are pursued through lending, the production of research and economic analysis and the provision of
policy advice and technical assistance.74
A product of World War II, the World Bank was initially envisioned to address the financial needs of a post-war reconstruction.75 Harry Dexter White, a U.S. Treasury official and one of
the original drafters of the plan for the World Bank, stated that
the primary objectives of the World Bank were to “provide or
otherwise stimulate long-term, low-interest-rate loans for reconstruction and for the development of capital-poor areas.”76
Reconstruction was, nevertheless, the World Bank’s dominating
objective during the initial decade and a half of the its life.77 By
the early 1960s, however, the political topography of the world
had been drastically altered.78 Adapting to this changing political reality led the World Bank to shift its priorities “from reconstruction to development and from Europe to the developing
world.”79
Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979). If the IMF deems that the borrowing member
state has failed to comply with these conditionalities, it can refuse to release
the next disbursement. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322.
73. THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES 10 (Christopher L. Gilbert
& David Vines eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND
POLICIES]. The World Bank was also created as a specialized agency of the
United Nations. The World Bank, What is the World Bank, at http://web.
worldbank.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
74. THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra note 73, at 10.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Commonly perceived as a single lending institution specializing in
development strategies, the World Bank is actually a large organization comprising an amalgam of four smaller units operating under the title of ‘World
Bank Group.’ Id. at 12. The original and central member of the World Bank
Group is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“IBRD”). Id. Its principal objective is “to borrow funds and lend these on to
qualifying member governments or to public sector institutions for agreed
projects.” Id. The second unit of the World Bank is the International Development Agency which functions as an aid agency, mainly confining its activi-
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Although the membership of the World Bank is coextensive
with the membership of the IMF, the working objectives of the
World Bank differ markedly from those of the IMF, most noticeably in that the World Bank functions first and foremost in
its banking capacity as a financial intermediary.80 It raises
money by selling bonds on the international capital market and
subsequently lends these funds to member states at a small
It
mark-up over the World Bank’s AAA81 borrowing rate.82
ties to 60 “IDA countries” that have a low GDP per capita. Id. Although the
IBRD and the IDA are almost entirely coextensive, differences basically center
on the duration of the loan, its interest rates and the source of the loaned
funds. Id. at 12–13. In essence, “[t]he Bank, as IDA, provides both development assistance and development aid while, as the IBRD, it provides assistance and enhanced access to capital.” Id. at 13. The third unit of the World
Bank is the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), which was founded in
1956. Id. at 12. This institution’s main objective is to strengthen domestic
industries by lending to private sector institutions and taking equity shares in
private sector enterprises. Id. The fourth and last unit is the Multinational
Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”), which was created in 1988. Id. Its
objective is to guarantee “private sector investors against expropriation and
repatriation risks in developing countries.” Id.
80. See THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra note 73, at 17.
As provided in its Articles of Agreement, the membership of the World Bank
is limited to sovereign states who are already members of the IMF. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 168. Similarities between the two institutions also
extend to the World Bank’s organizational and voting structures. The Board
of Governors, representing all member states, has all of the World Bank’s
powers vested in it, while the Executive Directors conduct the institution’s
daily operations. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, art. V,
sec. 2, 60 Stat. 1440, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 2 U.N.T.S.
134 [hereinafter World Bank Articles of Agreement]. As in the IMF, there is a
total of 24 Executive Directors with the United States, Japan, Germany,
France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, having their own
seats on the Board, and the remaining directors elected on a rotating two-year
basis. See World Bank, IBRD/IFC/IDA Executive Directors and Alternates, at
http://siteresources. worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/b-eds.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2003). Decisions are also based on a weighted voting system based on
capital subscriptions and on each member state’s economic strength. World
Bank Articles of Agreement, arts. II para. 3 and V para. 3, 60 Stat. 1441–54, 2
U.N.T.S. 136–72; see also World Bank, IBRD: Votes and Subscriptions, at
http://web.worbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZA
TION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20124831~menuPK:64020035~pagePK:64020
054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
81. An AAA-rating is the highest possible rating issued by rating agencies
such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. An AAA rating signifies a guarantee
that anyone who purchases AAA-rated bonds will be sure to get their money
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lends either “directly to a member government or [requires that
its loans be] guaranteed by the member government in whose
territory the project [or program] is located.”83 In addition, the
World Bank restricts the use of such loans “for the foreign exchange component of specific [programs or] projects.”84
Disbursement of aid is, however, conditional on the borrowing
state’s adoption of specified conditionalities. Article III(4) of the
World Bank’s Articles of Agreement provides that the World
Bank may provide loans “to any member or any political subdivision thereof and any business, industrial, and agricultural
enterprise in the territories of a member,” subject to the condition that the member state fully guarantee the repayment of
the principal and interest.85 The World Bank is further obligated to “pay due regard to the prospect that the borrower…
will be in [the] position to meet its obligations under the
loan…”86 The World Bank’s conditionalities are comprehensive,
and generally include policy and structural reforms in the borrowing state including improved governance, the elimination of
corruption and gender equality, among many others.87
3. The Changing Nature of the World Bank and the IMF
Since their inception in 1944, the World Bank and the IMF
have changed significantly in their respective scope of operations. Lending facilities have expanded from short-term remedial measures based on specific projects, to extensive policyback, with the agreed interest, when the bonds mature. See John Burgess,
Groups Plan Boycott of World Bank Bonds, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2000 at E03,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/bonds.htm;
see also The World Bank’s Bonds Are Getting Looser, at http://www.wbbe
urope.org/tool-kit-article3.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
82. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 168; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE
AND POLICIES, supra note 73, at 12.
83. Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S349, 353 (1992)(citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. World Bank Article of Agreement, supra note 80, art. III, sec. 4., 60
Stat. at 1443, 2 U.N.T.S. at 144.
86. Id. World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 80, art. III, sec. 4,
para. 5, 16 U.S.T. at 1443–44, 2 U.N.T.S. at 144.
87. See Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human Rights Law and
The Role of International Financial Institutions in Promoting Human Rights,
33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 71, 94–95 (2000).
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oriented programmatic interventions, often encompassing important regulatory and structural changes in developing member states. These institutions’ ranges of activities have also become increasingly intertwined, most distinctively during the
last two decades.
The 1980s trumpeted the benefits of free market ideology,
and the IMF and the World Bank became the “new missionary
institutions” emblematic of this change.88 From this prevalent
political climate emerged a new “Washington Consensus,” a
doctrine based upon the consensus of the IMF, the World Bank,
and the U.S. Treasury.89 The Washington Consensus was dedicated to: “(i) deregulation and opening domestic markets to foreign goods and services; (ii) freeing trade and (iii) opening domestic capital markets to the free flow of international capital.”90 The Bretton Woods institutions were to promote these
objectives by: “(i) facilitating the rapid liberalization of the
goods markets and removing or reducing barriers to trade (ii)
encouraging Governments to tighten fiscal and monetary policies (iii) promoting stable exchange rates and (iv) liberalizing
capital markets.”91 Although the IMF and the World Bank’s
respective missions remained and continue to remain separate
and distinct, it is during this time period that their activities
became increasingly co-dependant and intertwined.92 A brief
retrospective of these institutions’ lending facilities and respective activities provides a revealing illustration of this structural
shift towards a Washington Consensus policy-based orientation.
a. World Bank Lending Facilities
The World Bank’s founders intended primarily to provide assistance by guaranteeing private loans.93 In the 1950s, however,
the World Bank’s original scope was expanded to provide direct
loans to developing states experiencing a scarcity of private ex88. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 13.
89. G. Sivalingam, The Impact of Globalization on the Malaysian Economy
2, at http://www.insead.edu/events/eamsa/papers/sivalingam.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2003).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 13.
93. EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE
BRETTON WOODS 26 (1973).
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ternal sources of finance.94 These loans were provided for
through Structural Adjustment Programs (“SAP”) whereby financing could serve as a “[vehicle] for the design and implementation of projects, particularly in the infrastructure sector.”95 In
the late 1970s, the World Bank further expanded its scope of
operations to focus on inappropriate public policies in developing countries that were burdened with “large fiscal deficits…unsustainable balance-of-payments deficit[s] and…open or
repressed inflation.”96 Local governments often further exacerbated the rampant financial hardship of these countries by pursuing “expansionary demand policies.”97
Conscious of the difficulties that such unstable macroeconomic environments presented, the World Bank cast aside the
use of project-oriented initiatives and started resorting to Structural Adjustment Lending (“SAL”).98 This lending facility was
geared for “quick-disbursing balance-of-payments support to
assist [developing] member countries in implementing a less
costly adjustment to external shocks.”99 These loans, however,
imposed significant conditions upon the disbursement of financial assistance. Member states were expected to “achieve both
long-term macroeconomic stabilization and structural transformation of [their economies] by addressing the fundamental
causes of [their] economic crises.”100 More specifically, they were
required to “bring…the level of demand and its composition
([the proportion of] tradable relative to non-tradable goods), into
line with the level of output and external financing.”101 These
objectives were to be accomplished through the implementation
of policies and legislation designed to achieve the necessary
94. Sisters in the Wood: Distant Relations, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 9
[hereinafter Distant Relations].
95. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 169.
96. Vittorio Corbo & Stanley Fischer, Adjustment Programs and Bank
Support: Rationale and Main Results, in ADJUSTMENT LENDING REVISITED:
POLICIES TO RESTORE GROWTH 7 (Vittorio Corbo et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Corbo & Fischer, Adjustments Programs].
97. Id.
98. See ADJUSTMENT LENDING REVISITED: POLICIES TO RESTORE GROWTH 1
(Vittorio Corbo et al. eds., 1992).
99. Id.
100. Corbo & Fischer, Adjustments Programs, supra note 96, at 7 (emphasis
in original).
101. Id.
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macroeconomic corrections.102 The recurrent use of this facility
throughout the 1980s resulted in SALs accounting for a quarter
of World Bank lending by the end of the decade.103
In order to ensure the success rates of SALs, however, the
World Bank limited the availability of this lending facility to
member states already benefiting from an IMF sponsored stabilization program.104 In this way, the World Bank essentially
came to condition its loans upon explicit approval from the IMF.
Although this arrangement did improve the probabilities for
high success rates, this “no Fund programme, no SAL” rule
eventually proved a nuisance.105 The World Bank therefore introduced the Sector Adjustment Loan (“SECAL”), which was
directed at states lacking an IMF program.106 These loans “support[] policy changes and institutional reforms in a specific sector” and “focus on major sectoral issues such as the incentive
and regulatory frameworks for private sector development, institutional capability, and sector expenditure programs.”107
The most noteworthy characteristic of the SALs and SECALs,
however, is their heavy emphasis on policy-based objectives.108
Whereas the World Bank was initially focused on small, projectbased facilities, it eventually expanded to address the general
macroeconomic stability and balance of payments problems of
developing member states.
b. IMF Lending Facilities
The IMF similarly shifted from small scale lending facilities
to comprehensive initiatives heavily slanted towards policy102. See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The
World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
159, 160 (1993) (arguing the World Bank uses it leverage to “legislate entire
legal regimes…and often rewrite[s] a country’s trade policies, [and] fiscal policies”). Id. at 160.
103. See id. at 175–76.
104. Sisters in the Wood; Until Debt Us Do Part, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991,
at 14 [hereinafter Until Debt Us Do Part].
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK LENDING INSTRUMENTS: RESOURCES FOR
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, at 17, at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wbactiviti
es/lend.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
108. See Cahn, supra note 102, at 174–75; see also Distant Relations, supra
note 94; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104.
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oriented objectives.109 The IMF was created to offer member
states temporary facilities in order to maintain the stability of
the international monetary system.110 To achieve this objective,
the IMF provided, and continues to provide, for diverse means
of access to available funds, the amount of which is directly related to each member state’s quota.111
At its inception, funds were divided into a “reserve tranche”
and four equivalent “credit tranches.”112 The reserve tranche
was part of a member’s own reserves kept on deposit with the
IMF and access to it was virtually unimpeded.113 Each of the
credit tranches, however, represented 25% of the member’s
quota and a member’s access to any of them was conditioned on
the IMF’s authorization.114 While the first tranche was fairly
easy to obtain, access to the remaining three credit tranches
was subject to much closer scrutiny and “almost always require[d] a stand-by or similar arrangement”115 between the IMF
and the borrowing member state.
These stand-by arrangements were essentially agreements
between the IMF and member states providing for the latter’s
borrowing of hard currencies, should the need arise.116 As they
were intended to “provide short-term balance-of-payments assistance for deficits of a temporary or cyclical nature,”117 they
had to be repaid within three years and “were assessed near
market interest rates.”118 Moreover, stand-bys were only disbursed in installments and included “rigid performance [based]
conditionalities.”119 The structure of these arrangements illus-

109. See Distant Relations, supra note 94.
110. What is the IMF?, supra note 54; see also Sisters in the Wood; A Fund
by Design, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 14 [hereinafter A Fund by Design].
111. A Fund by Design, supra note 110, at 7. A “quota” is each IMF member
state’s proportion of contribution of gold to the IMF and their concomitant
ability to draw from the IMF. See The IMF and the World Bank – The Origins
of the IFIs, at http://www.globalization101.org/issue/imfworldbank/2.asp (last
visited Feb. 8, 2004).
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 171.
119. Id.
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trates that these lending facilities were not meant to address
any issues of a “structural or socioeconomic nature” within the
borrowing member state, but rather solely focused on the IMF’s
primary objective of economic stabilization.120
The IMF, however, began expanding its facilities by the early
1980s as it experienced difficulties in addressing balance of
payments problems through its customary lending facilities.121
To address the complexities of an increasingly unstable monetary environment, the IMF introduced the Extended Fund Facility (“EFF”).122 This facility was designed to allow member
states to borrow up to 140 percent of their quota with a repayment period of four to ten years instead of three to five years.123
Still an insufficient tool to address the pervasive debt obligations of the poorest states, the institution further expanded its
facilities in 1986 by establishing the Structural Adjustment Facility (“SAF”), which charged an interest rate of only one-half
percent.124 SAF loans included a repayment period of five to ten
years, and “were financed by sovereign repayments to the IMF
during the 1970’s and disbursed to finance three-year stabilization programs.”125
As the SAF resources neared depletion, the IMF introduced
yet another type of loan, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (“ESAF”).126 The funds were raised through contributions of major developed member governments, and borrowing
states could receive double the amount obtainable under the

120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Decision
No. 4377-(74/114), Sept. 13, 1974, art. I(iv), in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 33 (1987).
123. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 171; see also International Monetary
Fund, Executive Board Decision No. 6339-(79/179), Dec. 3, 1979, in SELECTED
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
50, 50–54 (1976); International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Decision No.
6830-(81/65), Apr. 22, 1981, in SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 515, 515–16 (June 30, 1997).
124. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172; see also INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: CONCESSIONAL FACILITIES RESIST
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES, IMF SURVEY: SUPPLEMENT ON THE IMF 1, 21 (1993).
125. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172; see also Until Debt Us Do Part,
supra note 104.
126. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172.
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SAF.127 The major difference, however, was that the conditionalities and the scrutiny attached to these loans was much
stricter.128 In addition, “ESAF funds were disbursed in smaller
installments than under the SAF, and subjected to frequent
performance-based tests.”129 The IMF’s satisfaction with the
performance of its new lending facilities at the close of the decade resulted in its establishment of about 30 SAF and ESAF
facilities in Africa, and the virtual disappearance of EFFs and
standbys from the continent.130
The IMF’s use of the SAF and ESAF lending facilities marked
a change in the institution’s method of addressing balance of
payments inequities. Whereas loans were initially short-term
and typically focused on redressing balance of payments problems, they gradually evolved into policy-based instruments requiring the implementation of important structural and policy
changes within the borrowing government.131 Furthermore, as
the majority of these stabilizing facilities were disbursed to the
developing world, the IMF’s activities increasingly became developmental in nature.132
This overlap of activities between the IMF’s progressive policy-based facilities and the World Bank’s original developmental mandate was eventually formally reinforced in an official
agreement between the two Bretton Woods institutions.133 In
March of 1989, the World Bank and the IMF entered into a
“concordat” whereby the two institutions formalized their already established practice that World Bank structural adjustment loans would exclude member states lacking an IMF stabilization program.134 They further agreed that “the IMF would
have ‘primary responsibility’ over short-term stabilization and
exchange rates, and the Bank would be in the lead on medium
and longer-term structural reform.”135 In this way, the World
Bank and IMF operations became officially and permanently
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104.
Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 172–73.
Id. at 173.
Id.; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104.
Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104.
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interconnected and their combined policies of stabilization and
structural adjustment developed into a standard feature of
World Bank and IMF interventions.
4. Conditionality
A central and controversial aspect of World Bank and IMF
activities is reflected in the institutions’ use of conditions for
their lending facilities.136 As with many exchanging partners,
the IFIs require debtor states to provide credible commitments
to increase certainty of repayment and ensure cooperation in
the implementation of the loans. These commitments, or conditions, essentially provide an infrastructure which the IFIs believe will allow the debtor state to stabilize, grow, and pay off
the debt.137 Although the IFIs have been severely criticized for
the inclusion of conditions reflecting policy-oriented objectives,
conditionalities remain an integral component of the institutions’ lending facilities and have grown to include matters previously considered outside of the institutions’ scope of activities.138
a. Conditions Defined
The conditions that the various borrowing states submit to
are quasi-contractual in nature, as is underscored by the definition of “conditionality.”139 Tony Killick defines aid conditionality
as “a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or
promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an
IFI…or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial
assistance.”140 Others define it as “the linking of the disbursement of a loan to understandings concerning the economic policy which the government of the borrower country intends to

136. See generally MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY:
IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS 45–75 (1997); See generally
STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 43–52.
137. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 45; STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 44.
138. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 44–45; see also discussion, infra at Part
II.A.3.a.
139. The definitions included in this section are equally applicable to the
IMF’s and World Bank’s practices.
140. TONY KILLICK ET AL., AID AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY
CHANGE 6 (1998).
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pursue.”141 These conditions enable the IMF and the World Bank
“independently to examine the country’s need for balance of
payments assistance and to require the adoption of corrective
policies before funds are disbursed.”142
“Although the failure of a member state to meet these conditions is not a fortiori a breach of contract or a violation of international law,” there are three important repercussions for noncompliance.143 First, the institutions may limit, or restrict, the
noncompliant nation’s credit.144 In order to ensure compliance,
the IMF and the World Bank condition the release of credit
upon the borrowing state’s fulfillment of performance criteria
previously stipulated in a credit agreement.145 A borrowing
state must therefore fulfill these performance criteria in order
to be deemed compliant with the conditions.146 Second, the institutions can suspend the next disbursement if they determine
that the borrowing state has failed to comply with these conditions.147 Finally, because private creditors consider the institutions’ approval of a member state’s economy a “seal of approval,” the institutions’ determination that a particular state
has been noncompliant can result in the practical elimination of
the debtor state’s private funding.148 As these repercussions can
have disastrous financial consequences, a debtor state has every
incentive to comply with the loan agreement’s terms and conditions.149
While loan agreements and conditions are of a mandatory nature, they are meant to result from an ongoing dialogue be141. Paul Mosley, A Theory of Conditionality, in DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND
POLICY REFORM: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONDITIONALITY IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 129 (Paul Mosley ed., 1992).
142. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 166.
143. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also John W. Head, Global Implications of the Asian Financial
Crisis: Banking, Economic Integration, and Crisis Management in the New
Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 939, 945 (1999).
146. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322.
147. Id. at 1322; see also Head, supra note 145, at 945.
148. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322; see also Anthony Galano III, International
Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of
Conditionality Have Undermined Brazil’s National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT’L
L. REV. 323, 339 (1994); See AGE F.P. BAKKER, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 51 (1996).
149. See Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322.
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tween the debtor state and the IFI in question.150 For instance,
a government seeking IMF assistance must provide evidence
that it is “seriously committed to economic reform.”151 This will
usually take the form of a “letter of intent” outlining “the
government’s major orientations in macro-economic policy and
debt management.”152 The typical loan agreement will therefore
include the debtor state’s proposed policy reforms concerning
various sectors of the economy and government, while the arrangement itself, will contain additional policy proposals, review schedules, and binding conditions.153 Similarly, in the case
of many indebted states, the borrowing government “is obliged
under its agreement with the [financial institutions] to outline
its priorities in a…‘Policy Framework Paper.’”154 These government-generated documents, although heavily influenced by the
institutions’ input, eventually form the basis for the final loan
agreement and its appurtenant conditions.
b. Conditions as a Policy Tool
As a general matter, conditionalities are a reflection of policies endorsed by the IFIs.155 The inherent nature of loan agreements enables the institutions to prescribe a set of policy actions, which the debtor state must accept in order to receive the
necessary funding.156 Although the institutions’ economic prescriptions have remained consistent since the 1980s, an examination into their policy objectives reveals that conditionalities
have gradually expanded in scope to include not only economic
but political considerations as well.157
150. See CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 53–54.
151. Id. at 53.
152. Id.
153. Erica R. Gould, The Changing Activities of International Organizations:
The Case of the International Monetary Fund 8 (unpublished paper initially
prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meetings of the American Political
Science Association, Aug. 31 – Sept. 3, 2000 (cited with permission of the author)), available at http://spe.cgu.edu/econ/conferences/2000_peifc/papers/goul
d_changing_activities.pdf.
154. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 54.
155. Id. at 52.
156. Id.
157. Carlos Santiso, World Bank and Good Governance: Good Governance
and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality, 7 GEO. PUB. POL’Y
REV. 1, 2 (2001).
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The Washington Consensus emerged in the 1980s as an economic orthodoxy that has permeated the institutions’ lending
facilities since its inception.158 A by-product of free market ideologies, “[t]he consensus’ policy prescriptions include opening
trade, fiscal restraint, prudent macroeconomic management,
deregulation and privatization.”159 The consensus evolved from
the Latin American financial crisis of the 1980s where “[l]oose
monetary policy led to inflation running out of control.”160 Based
largely on the political climate at the time, the prescriptions
utilized in dealing with the crisis (i.e., fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization), were permanently adopted
by the IFIs as the models for future financial assistance packages.161
These policies translated into comprehensive programs of
macro-economic stabilization and structural economic reform.
As explained by Professor Chossudovsky, “[s]tructural adjustment is viewed by the IFIs as consisting of two distinct phases:
‘Short-term’ macro-economic stabilization (implying devaluation, price liberalization and budgetary austerity) to be followed
by the implementation of a number of more fundamental…
structural reforms.”162 Conditions under the Washington Consensus may therefore require the debtor state to implement reforms including currency devaluation;163 “liberalization of the
labor market;”164 reduction of the budget deficit;165 “ceilings” on
state expenditures;166 price liberalization;167 trade liberalization;168 privatization of state enterprises;169 tax reforms;170 priva-

158. See Sivalingam, supra note 89, at 2.
159. Santiso, supra note 157, at 13–14 (citations omitted).
160. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 53.
161. See id. at 16–17.
162. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 55.
163. Id. at 56 (“including the unification of the exchange rate and the elimination of exchange controls”).
164. Id. at 56–57.
165. Id. at 59.
166. Id. at 60.
167. Id. at 61 (“elimination of all subsidies and price controls”).
168. Id. at 63 (“elimination of import quotas and the reduction and unification of tariffs”).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 64 (“[T]he introduction of a value-added or sales tax and changes
in the structure of direct taxation.”).
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tization of agricultural land;171 deregulation of the banking system;172 liberalization of capital movements;173 and poverty reduction through targeted social programs.174
Beginning in the early 1990s, the World Bank and IMF fundamentally shifted their policies and strategies by introducing
the concept of “good governance” both as an objective and a condition for financial assistance.175 This shift in policy reflected an
increasing recognition by the IFIs “that the reasons for underdevelopment and mismanaged government are ‘sometimes attributable to weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal
framework, damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain
and variable policy frameworks and a closed decision-making
process which increases risks of corruption and waste.’”176 This
change also resulted from growing pressure by donor governments to address the prevalent corruption, economic mismanagement and bureaucratic ineptness preventing the repayment
of their financial investments.177
The World Bank defines governance as encompassing “the
form of political regime; the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; and the capacity of governments to
design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.”178 The World Bank has distinguished “six main dimensions of good governance: [v]oice and accountability, which includes civil liberties and political stability; [g]overnment effectiveness, which includes the quality of policymaking and public
service delivery; [t]he lack of regulatory burden; [t]he rule of
law, which includes protection of property rights;
171. Id.
172. Id. at 64–65.
173. Id. at 65–66 (“[T]he IMF insists on the transparency and free movement of foreign exchange in and out of the country.”).
174. Id. at 66–67.
175. Santiso, supra note 157, at 1–2.
176. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). Although the author is specifically referring to the World Bank, these principles are equally applicable to the IMF.
See id.
177. Santiso, supra note 157, at 4.
178. Id. at 4. Although the World Bank recognizes the importance of the
political dimension of governance, it interprets the concept restrictively by
arguing that the focus is solely placed on the economic dimensions of good
governance. Id.
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[i]ndependence of the judiciary; and [c]ontrol of corruption.”179
The IMF broadly defines governance as encompassing “all
aspects of the way a country, corporation, or other entity is governed.”180 According to the IMF, “[i]t includes the economicpolicy interactions that fall within the mandate and expertise of
the IMF,” as well as “their effectiveness; their transparency,
and thus the accountability of policy makers; and the extent to
which they meet internationally accepted standards and good
practices.”181 The IMF has recognized two spheres in which it
considers itself best placed to contribute to good governance,
namely:
Improving the management of public resources through reforms covering public sector institutions (e.g., the treasury,
central bank, public enterprises, civil service, and the official
statistics function), including administrative procedures (e.g.,
expenditure control, budget management, and revenue collection); and
Supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector activities (e.g., price systems,
exchange and trade regimes, and banking systems and their
related regulations).182

The introduction of good governance adds a normative concept to the economic orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus,
giving rise to what some analysts have described as a “postWashington Consensus.”183 This newly defined consensus brings
three important dimensions to the IFIs’ lending facilities. First,
the concept of governance recognizes the importance of politics
and its influence over development matters within the debtor
state.184 It underscores the need to reform “not only the policies
but also the institutional framework in which policies are formulated.”185 The IFIs have given increasing recognition to the
179. Santiso, supra note 157, at 4 (emphasis added).
180. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE IMF’S APPROACH TO PROMOTING
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND COMBATING CORRUPTION – A GUIDE, at http://www.imf.
org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm (last modified Dec. 9, 2002).
181. Id.
182. Id. (emphasis in original).
183. Santiso, supra note 157, at 14.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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fact that macroeconomic policy changes must be complemented
with effective democratic institutions that are able to support
the social consequences of structural adjustment programs.186
The IFIs’ post-Washington Consensus therefore requires
“strengthening the institutions of governance, enhancing the
rule of law and enhancing accountability and transparency.”187
A second dimension of the new consensus concerns the state.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the IFIs were essentially focused
on “balancing public finances and reducing the size of the bureaucracy.”188 The role of the state was relegated to second place
as the institutions placed an emphasis on “strengthening nonstate actors and promoting decentralization and local governance.”189 The reforms sought by the IFIs, however, necessitate a
strong and effective state governed by the rule of law. The institutions’ lending facilities have included the dual focus of stabilizing and liberalizing the economy while simultaneously “reforming the state and strengthening governing institutions.”190
These latter adjustments entail “improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of governing institutions (in particular the judiciary and parliaments), developing sound financial markets with
appropriate regulations and supervision, enhancing legal and
regulatory environments, improving the quality of the public
sector and building social capital and cohesion.”191 While the
state is expected to become leaner, the transition necessitates
strong political institutions and a responsive bureaucracy. The
IFIs have therefore also begun to acknowledge the crucial role
of the state and the importance of good governance in providing
an appropriate legal and regulatory framework to support the
institutions’ reforms.192
Finally, the post-Washington Consensus recognizes the need
to strengthen public institutions. Public institutions are defined as “formal and informal rules and their enforcement
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 15.
190. Id. at 14; see also Moises Naim, Washington Consensus or Washington
Confusion?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Apr. 1, 2000, at 87–103, available at 2000 WL
18912666.
191. Santiso, supra note 157, at 14.
192. See id. at 14.
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mechanisms that shape the behavior of individuals and organizations in society.”193 As the Washington Consensus often ignored issues of institutional reform, the post-Washington Consensus places an emphasis on addressing fundamental institutional weaknesses, inappropriate public policies and unenforced legal frameworks.194
While the post-Washington Consensus adds another dimension to the IFIs’ lending facilities, it neither supplants nor limits the policies initially espoused by the Washington Consensus.
The institutions continue to view sound macroeconomic policies
as an indispensable basis of financial assistance. Remaining
steady in its financial prescriptions, the IFIs’ post Washington
Consensus has merely broadened the reform agenda to include
the complex realm of national politics.195
B. Conditions to Address Terrorism
As international institutions with unmatched resources at
their disposal, the World Bank and the IMF are uniquely positioned to address state failure and the prevention of terrorism.
To this end, the IFIs could restructure their loan agreements to
take into account the distinguishing characteristics of a state’s
slide into failure (i.e., its political goods deficit) in the context of
terrorism prevention. While loan funds could help a state deliver key political goods, conditions on such loans could serve as
a vehicle for the implementation of an anti-terrorism regulatory
framework.196 Incorporating these principles within the IFIs’
193. SHAHID JAVED BURKI & GUILLERMO E. PERRY ET. AL, BEYOND THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: INSTITUTIONS MATTER 11 (1998) (emphasis in original).
194. Santiso, supra note 157, at 15.
195. Id. at 16.
196. Both the IMF and the World Bank have done some limited work in
terms of including anti-terrorism considerations within their policies. However, these considerations are currently at a preliminary stage and are limited
to the issues of anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Moreover, it is not clear whether these considerations will be included as a conditionality in the IFIs’ financial assistance programs. See MONETARY AND
EXCHANGE AFFAIRS AND LEGAL DEPARTMENTS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
& THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, WORLD BANK, TWELVE-MONTH PILOT PROGRAM OF
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
(AML/CFT) ASSESSMENTS AND DELIVERY OF AML/CFT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:
JOINT INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT OF THE WORK OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD
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loan conditions presents two important issues. First, can the
IFIs condition their loans on antiterrorism prevention where
their respective charters prohibit them from addressing questions of political and civil rights? Second, how could such loan
conditions be structured when the international community has
not yet agreed upon a comprehensive terrorism convention?
The following sections will address these two questions.
1. Moving Beyond Antiquated Mandates
In examining a possible role for the IFIs in the war against
terrorism, it is essential to fully appreciate their founding purposes. In this regard, attention must turn to the IFIs’ constitutional mandates and the significance of their respective scopes
of operations over fifty years after the Bretton Woods conference.
The World Bank was primarily founded with the objective of
assisting in the economic development of developing member
states and to promote private foreign investment.197 By contrast, the IMF’s purpose is to promote the stability of the international monetary system.198 An important aspect of the IFIs’
financial assistance programs is their categorical refusal to address questions of political and civil rights within the borrowing
member state. According to the World Bank’s Articles of
Agreement:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.199

The World Bank’s Articles further provide that it is to “make
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used
only for the purposes for which the loan was granted…without

BANK (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2003/eng/0
33103.htm.
197. See discussion supra at Part III.A.2.
198. See discussion supra at Part III.A.1.
199. World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 80, art. IV, sec. 10., 60
Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 158.
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regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.” 200
Although the IMF’s Articles of Agreement do not have a similar provision, their general stipulation requiring it to “be guided
in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth”201 has
been interpreted as having a similar effect.202 Moreover, Article
IV provides that in exercising surveillance over the exchange
rate policies of its member states, the IMF shall adopt principles for the guidance of its members and that “[t]hese principles
shall respect the domestic, social and political policies of members.”203
The IFIs’ apolitical stance has generated considerable debate
in recent years.204 It is often argued that the IFIs’ Articles of
Agreement place a legal constraint on the IFIs’ lending practices and that financial assistance should therefore not be withheld on the basis of non-economic reasons.205 This argument is
based on the belief that IFI loans should be non-discriminatory
and that in supporting economic, social and cultural rights for
all, the IFIs have paved the way for greater political freedoms
while remaining politically neutral.206 According to these “strict
interpretation” advocates, “[n]o reasonable interpretation…can
transform prohibition into permission.”207
Although literally correct, this argument has been undermined by the IFIs’ actual practice, particularly within the past
ten years.208 Both the World Bank and the IMF have signifi-

200. Id. at art. III, sec. 5, para. b, 60 Stat. at 1443–44, 2 U.N.T.S. at 146.
201. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. I, 29 U.S.T. at 2205, 2
U.N.T.S. at 42.
202. Joseph Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited by Articles of
Agreement When the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, 1983 IMF
SUR. 145, 146 (1983). Sir Joseph Gold was General Counsel to the IMF from
1960-79. Id. at 148.
203. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. IV, sec. 3, para. b, 29
U.S.T. at 2209.
204. Morais, supra note 87, at 88.
205. For an outline of these arguments see Morais, supra note 87, at 88.
206. Morais, supra note 87, at 88–89.
207. Id. at 89.
208. See Santiso, supra note 157, at 2 (“During the 1980s and 1990s, the
scope of [the IFIs’] conditionalities both widened and deepened as IFIs attempted governmental and social re-engineering.”); see also Morais, supra
note 87, at 90–94 (“the record clearly shows that the IFIs are actually doing
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cantly expanded their respective scopes of operation since the
institutions’ inception at the close of World War II.209 Initially
structured as short-term remedial measures, the IFIs’ lending
facilities have developed into extensive policy-oriented programmatic interventions, often encompassing substantial regulatory and structural changes within the borrowing member
state.210 Most notably, however, the IFIs’ introduction of “good
governance” as both an objective and condition for financial
assistance has further blurred the distinction between “politics”
and “economics.”211 This “post-Washington Consensus” has not
only legitimized the IFIs’ promotion of measures to fight corruption and improve transparency and accountability of institutions and officials, but has also led to the IFIs’ active involvement in the promotion of legal and judicial reforms.212 In this
regard, the IFIs have recommended and assisted member states
in “drafting new laws, amending existing laws, reforming court
systems and training judges.”213 These legal reforms have
touched upon politically sensitive areas such as “corruption
among public officials (both politicians and civil servants), local
government reform, civil service reform, reform of the court system, tax reform, strengthening regulatory and supervisory institutions, enhancing women’s rights, social security or pension
reforms, and promoting public participation.”214
Aside from empirical evidence of the IFIs’ increasingly political endeavors, it remains debatable whether a legal analysis of
the IFIs’ articles of agreement leads to the conclusion that these

much more than they have ever done to promote human rights in a comprehensive and meaningful way”). Id. at 90.
209. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
210. See Morais, supra note 87, at 89 (listing the additional areas the IFIs
have financed such as “reform of civil service, reform of public sector enterprises, legal and judicial reform, reform of local governments…rights of indigenous peoples,” to name but a few). Id. at 89.
211. See Santiso, supra note 157, at 1; see also Morais, supra note 87, at 90.
212. See Santiso, supra note 157, at 14 (“An important dimension of the
post-Washington consensus is the recognition that politics matters for development. It suggests that sustaining development requires reforming not only
the policies but also the institutional framework in which policies are formulated.”) Id.; see also Morais, supra note 87, at 94 (“IFIs have become very active in promoting legal and judicial reforms in their member countries.”). Id.
213. Morais, supra note 87, at 94.
214. Id. at 95.
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institutions are strictly prohibited from delving into the political realm.215 Both the IMF and the World Bank were formed as
specialized agencies of the UN.216 As such, one might argue that
the UN Charter is hierarchically superior to the IFIs’ own articles of agreement. Article 55 of the UN Charter provides that
“the United Nations shall promote…universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”217 Although the UN Charter also contains a provision prohibiting
interference in internal political affairs,218 the UN has repeatedly interpreted this provision as inapplicable to human rights
because such matters are not considered to be the prerogative of
a sovereign state.219 If that is the case, why should the IFIs be
considered exempt from fulfilling the fundamental objectives of
a hierarchically superior institution?
Legal analysis aside, it is clear that the IFIs’ apolitical stance
has become outdated and that the international donor community has given growing recognition to the political barometer of
borrowing member states.220 To this end, the IFIs should begin
applying financial and technical assistance in the context of
anti-terrorism prevention. Terrorism is not only a politically
motivated act,221 but it is also an act that has been widely recognized as a violation of human rights.222 As such, and considering
215. See id. at 90–94.
216. Id. at 84.
217. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
218. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
219. See Olivera Medenica, Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did
NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 329, 347–60 (2001).
220. See generally Morais, supra note 87.
221. See discussion supra Part I.A.
222. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1977)
(stating that terrorist activities or individuals or groups are in clear disregard
of human rights); U.N. Comm. H.R., Res. 2000/30, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/167 (2000); U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1998/47, U.N.
ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 158, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/47 (1998);
U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1997/42, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 139,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/42 (1997); U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1999/27, U.N.
ESCOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 113, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/27 (1999);
U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1998/73, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 234,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/73 (1998) (hostage-taking is aimed at the destruction
of human rights); G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
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the IFIs’ current practice, it falls squarely within their respective scopes of operation.
2. Framework
The next question necessarily becomes: how are anti-terrorist
conditions to be formulated? A significant response must not
only combine prevention with prosecution, but must also successfully address the idiosyncrasies of state failure and the domestic prevention of terrorism. Perhaps most importantly, such
conditions must be aligned with an anti-terrorism standard accepted by the international community (i.e., the international
donor community).
a. International Conventions and Protocols
Although there are a host of multilateral conventions addressing terrorist acts, there is no comprehensive multilateral
convention governing terrorism alone. Specifically, the existing
ten conventions and two protocols cover: airports and airplane
hijacking;223 attacks upon “internationally protected persons;”224
283, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (1991); G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII) (1972); Organization of African Unity,. Declaration and Plan of Action 12,
CONF/HRA/DECL(I) (1999), at http://ncb.intnet.mu/mfa/oau/decpl.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2003) (condemnation of terrorism as a violation of human
rights); Siracuse, Italy: Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes, Final
Document: Conclusions and Recommendations, pt. I 1–2, reprinted in M.
CHERIF, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES xi (1975); Michael J.
Bazyler, Capturing Terrorists in the “Wild Blue Yonder”: International Law
and the Achille Lauro and Libyian Aircraft Incidents, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 685,
688 (1986); Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What is
Being Done?, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 383, 387–88 (1977); Jordan J. Paust, The
Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its Implications for the Law
of State Responsibility, 11 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41 (1987); S.C. Res.
579, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243
(1986) (taking of hostages and abductions have severe consequences for the
rights of victims and are manifestations of terrorism); G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N.
GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1985) (terrorism violates human dignity and loss of innocent lives, and mindful of relevant
human rights instruments, all acts of terrorism, “by whomever committed,”
are unequivocally condemned).
223. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 10 I.L.M.
1151 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of
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thefts of nuclear materials;225 the taking of hostages;226 unlawful
acts against maritime navigation and fixed platforms on the
continental shelf;227 terrorist bombing;228 the financing of terrorism;229 and the making of plastic explosives.230 Most of these instruments place legal obligations upon contracting states to:
criminalize the acts covered and establish appropriate penalties
for crimes committed; provide jurisdiction for certain offenses;
provide custody and make a preliminary factual inquiry of the
alleged offenders; give notification to interested states of the
actions taken; prosecute the alleged offender if the state does
not grant extradition; consider the offense to be an “extraditable
offence” for purposes of an extradition treaty; and provide assistance in connection with criminal proceedings regarding the
offences covered.231
While these conventions and protocols are of tremendous importance, they are inadequate in addressing state failure and
the domestic prevention of terrorism. As Jennifer Trahan

Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704
U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
224. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1977, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Protected Persons Convention].
225. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124.
226. See Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention].
227. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101–1, 1678
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Maritime Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101–1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
228. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/164 (1997) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention].
229. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/109 (1999) [hereinafter Financing of Terrorism Convention].
230. See Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, SEN. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359
[hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention].
231. See Trahan, supra note 52, at 220.
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notes, they are filled with gaps and inconsistencies and only
highlight the need for a comprehensive multilateral convention.232 First, these instruments have little, if any, preventative
focus.233 If prevention is addressed, it is usually formulated in
broad language and limited to a single article.234 The Montreal
Convention, for instance, states that “Contracting States shall,
in accordance with international and national law, endeavour to
take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the
offences” covered by the convention.235 The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons also provides for state cooperation by “exchanging information and co-ordinating the taking of administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the
commission of those crimes.”236 This open-ended language not
only lacks specificity but may also result in states taking little
or no action at all.237
Second, some of these conventions and protocols are inapplicable if the acts covered by these instruments occur solely in
one state.238 For instance, if a terrorist act is committed within
232. Trahan, supra note 52, at 220–21.
233. Id. at 222.
234. Id.
235. Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 10, para. 1, 24 U.S.T. at 571.
236. Protected Persons Convention, supra note 224, art. 4, para. b, 28 U.S.T.
at 170, 1035 U.N.T.S. at 170; see also Maritime Convention, supra note 227,
art. 13, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230, 231.
237. Although some conventions include a preventative focus, encumbering
conditions diminish the benefits of such language. For instance, certain conventions require that information be “accurate and verified” before sharing it
with other interested states. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra
note 229, art. 18, para. 3, G.A. Res. 109 at 412; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 15, para. b, G.A. Res. 164 at 393. Where terrorist
attacks are in question, this may simply take too much time. Other conventions provide detailed steps for the prevention of terrorism but include a
lengthy phase-in process for their implementation. See Plastic Explosives
Convention, supra note 230, art. 4, para. 2–3., SEN. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-8,
2122 U.N.T.S. at 375. Perhaps the best example of a convention including
detailed steps for the prevention of terrorism is the Financing of Terrorism
Convention. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229.
238. Trahan, supra note 52, at 225; See also Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3, G.A. Res. 109 at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A. Res. 164 at 390; Hostage Convention,
supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081 at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal
Convention, supra note 223, art. 4, para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569.
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a particular state, and the alleged offender and victims are nationals of that state, then these conventions do not apply.239 Accordingly, should such a situation arise, officials from that state
are under no international obligation to share information
about such an offense even if it may be politically related to a
potentially larger international crime.240 Similarly, other states
are under no obligation to provide assistance in possible criminal proceedings within that state.241 Although such provisions
were meant to safeguard the sovereignty of each contracting
state, it may prove counterproductive in an era of increasingly
global terrorism.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, because these conventions and protocols include little if any language addressing the
prevention of terrorism and do not address acts committed
within a single state, they impose no real obligation to combat
domestic terrorists that are active within a particular state but
have not yet committed a terrorist act.242 Thus, a condition requiring debtor states to sign on to these conventions before receiving aid from IFIs would be helpful, but would not necessarily be adequate to address the root causes of the problem.
b. UN Resolution 1373
Perhaps one of the best examples of the international community’s commitment to the fight against terrorism is UN Reso-

239. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3 G.A.
Res. 109. at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A.
Res. 164 at 390; Hostage Convention, supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081
at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 4,
para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569.
240. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3, G.A.
Res. 109 at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A.
Res. 164 at 390; Hostage Convention, supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081
at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 4,
para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569.
241. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3, G.A.
Res. 109 at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A.
Res. 164 at 390 ; Hostage Convention, supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081
at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 4,
para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569.
242. See Trahan, supra note 52, at 228.
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lution 1373.243 Adopted on September 28, 2001, Resolution 1373
forms the foundation of the UN’s counterterrorism efforts. This
resolution declares international terrorism a threat to “international peace and security” and imposes binding obligations on
all UN member states.244 It also establishes a Counterterrorism
Committee (“CTC”) consisting of all members of the Security
Council to monitor the implementation of the resolution.245
In Resolution 1373, the Security Council mandates that
states:
Refrain from providing any form of support to terrorist
groups;
Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;
Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or
commit terrorist acts;
Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts to use their territories to further terrorist purposes
against other states;
Ensure that any person financing, planning, or perpetrating terrorist acts is brought to justice and that such acts are
established as criminal offences in each state’s domestic laws;
Afford one another assistance in connection with criminal
proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist
acts;
Prevent the movement of terrorist(s) through effective border controls.246

Resolution 1373 also addresses the financing of terrorism, requiring states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts, criminalize the funding of terrorist groups by their nationals, freeze the financial assets of terrorists, and prohibit their
nationals from providing financial assets to terrorists.247 In addition, states are called upon to increase the exchange of infor-

243. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., Supp. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id. para. 2.
247. Id. para. 1.
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mation regarding terrorists and to become parties to the various
international conventions and protocols covering terrorism.248
In essence, Resolution 1373 “requires all member states to
review their domestic laws and practices to ensure that terrorists cannot finance themselves or find safe havens for their adherents or their operations on these states’ territory.”249 To this
end, the CTC is charged with the review of reports submitted by
member states of the UN detailing the steps undertaken to fulfill the objectives of Resolution 1373.250 Through this on-going
dialogue, the CTC is to focus on technical capacity building and
to “work with each state to implement the resolution at its fastest capable speed.”251 The reports that have been submitted to
the CTC thus far have therefore “varied in both quality and
length, largely reflecting the different levels of capacity among
states to implement Resolution 1373 and different levels of resources states have to prepare a report under Resolution
1373.”252
Although the non-threatening, capacity-building language of
Resolution 1373 contributed to its widespread support, it is also
one of its major weaknesses. There is simply no end-date as to
the resolution’s implementation, nor is there a timeframe as to
how long this process could potentially take.253 The CTC also
has no intention of declaring states to be in compliance with the
requirements of resolution 1373.254 In fact, as of April 2003, the
CTC declared that it will not operate as a sanctions committee
and therefore “will not report to the Security Council those
states it has determined are not in compliance with the obligations imposed by Resolution 1373.”255 There is therefore no ultimate requirement, other than diplomacy, to comply with the
resolution’s objectives.

248. Id. para. 3.
249. Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism
Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 333, 334
(2003).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 335.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 336.
255. Id.
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Another problem with Resolution 1373 is that some states
simply lack the technical and financial resources to implement
all of the concerns contained in the resolution. Pursuant to
Resolution 1373, the CTC has sought to address this issue by
identifying each state’s specific needs and matching them with
donors capable of providing the necessary assistance.256 To date,
over fifty member states have expressed an interest in receiving
assistance to enable them to adequately implement Resolution
1373.257 Unfortunately, the CTC does not have the resources to
provide such assistance. The successful implementation of
Resolution 1373 is therefore largely dependant upon outside
donors that are capable and willing to provide the necessary
assistance, whether financial or technical.
Finally, it is questionable whether the submission of written
reports by member states is sufficient to fulfill the resolution’s
objectives beyond its preliminary stages.258 Once states have
reported back to the CTC on their progress with regards to
Resolution 1373, written submissions may not be sufficient to
adequately monitor the newly enacted legislation and assess
the quality of its application.259 Perhaps effective implementation will require on-site monitoring by the CTC; an authority
that is neither explicitly, nor arguably implicitly, granted by
Resolution 1373.

256. Security Council Resolution 1377 invites the CTC “to explore ways in
which states can be assisted, and in particular to explore with international,
regional and subregional organizations: [t]he promotion of best-practice in the
areas covered by Resolution 1373 (2001)…t]he availability of existing technical, financial, regulatory, legislative or other assistance programmes which
might facilitate the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001)…[and] [t]he
promotion of possible synergies between these assistance programmes.” S.C.
Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 4413th mtg., Supp. 1, at 295, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377
(2001).
257. Rosand, supra note 249, at 339.
258. The CTC divided its work into three stages: Stage A would require
states to implement the necessary legislation; Stage B would require an executive machinery capable of handling these legislative changes; and Stage C
would require its proper implementation. See Rosand, supra note 249, at
335–36.
259. Rosand, supra note 249, at 339.
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c. A potential role for the IFIs
The IFIs could, however, play a vital role in addressing these
issues and fulfilling the objectives of Resolution 1373. Both the
IMF and the World Bank could begin incorporating Resolution
1373 into their lending facilities by imposing conditions on their
loans requiring the implementation of Resolution 1373 within a
specified timeframe. Each disbursement of funds would therefore become contingent on a state’s actual incorporation of certain counterterrorism measures within its national laws. Consideration should also be given to make funds available on a
grant basis to those states most in need of assistance in implementing Resolution 1373. These grants should be used exclusively for the purposes of Resolution 1373 and could impose the
same conditions and timeframes as the IFIs’ lending facilities.
Most importantly, however, the subject areas covered by
these conditions could be expanded beyond the IFIs’ traditional
mandates to include areas typically considered outside their
respective fields of operation. In addressing the root causes of
terrorism and the strengthening of weak states, the IFIs’ conditions could emphasize such important areas as prevention, suppression and the exchange of information. For instance, a state
could incorporate into its national laws preventative measures
such as the following:260
Preventing the use of its territory as a base for planning,
organizing, executing, attempting or taking part in terrorist
crime in any manner whatsoever. This includes the prevention of terrorist infiltration into, or residence in its territory either as individuals or groups, receiving or giving refuge to,
training, arming, financing, or providing any facilitation to
terrorists;
Developing and strengthening systems for the detection of
the movement, importation, exportation, stockpiling and use
of weapons, munitions and explosives and of other means of
260. These suggested measures are largely based on select language from
the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. See Arab Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 152, 155–56, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.3 (2001) [hereinafter Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism].
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aggression, murder and destruction as well as procedures for
monitoring their passage through customs and across borders;
Developing and strengthening systems concerned with surveillance procedures and the securing of borders and points of
entry overland and by air in order to prevent illicit entry;
Strengthening mechanisms for the security and protection
of eminent persons, vital installations and means of public
transportation.

As for suppressive measures, they could include:261
Arresting the perpetrators of terrorist offences and prosecuting them in accordance with national law or extraditing
them in accordance with relevant provisions of any applicable
treaties;
Providing effective protection for those working in the
criminal justice field;
Providing effective protection for sources of information
concerning terrorist offences and for witnesses of such offences;
Extending the necessary assistance to victims of terrorism.

Furthermore, technical assistance could be provided through
collaboration between the IFIs, the CTC, and the states receiving financial assistance. In order to maintain the integrity of a
genuine dialogue, the states in question could appoint a committee of three experts in the subject of terrorism.262 These experts would have the responsibility of communicating with CTC
experts appointed by the UN for the specific purpose of engaging in a discourse with states sponsored by the IFIs. Not only
would such a structure provide a forum for the exchange of expertise, but it would also provide a conduit for the exchange of
information.
In this regard, once this collaboration is established, states
receiving financial assistance could enact measures facilitating
the exchange of information between these states and the CTC

261. Id. at 157.
262. These experts could be drawn from a variety of different fields such as
academia, the government or private practice.
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with regards to potential activities and crimes of terrorists and
terrorist groups. For instance, these measures could include:263
Promoting the exchange of information with the CTC concerning:
a) The activities and crimes of terrorist groups and of
their leaders and members; their headquarters and training; the means and sources by which they are funded and
armed; the types of weapons, munitions and explosives
used by them; and other means of aggression, murder and
destruction;
b) The means of communication and propaganda used by
terrorist groups, their modus operandi; the movements of
their leaders and members; and the travel documents that
they use.
Notifying the CTC in an expeditious manner of the information it has concerning any terrorist offence that takes place
in its territory and is intended to harm the interests of that
state or of its nationals and to include in such notification
statements concerning the circumstances surrounding the offence, those who committed it, its victims, the losses occasioned by it and the devices and methods used in its perpetration;
Cooperating with the CTC in the exchange of information
for the suppression of terrorist offences and promptly notifying
the CTC of all the information or data in its possession that
may prevent the occurrence of terrorist offences in foreign territory, against such foreign state’s nationals or residents or
against their interests.264

Although such conditions would go a long way in the fight
against terrorism, it is important to note that these measures
are not meant to modify or supplant the IFIs’ emphasis on the
concept of “good governance.” The success of these measures is
almost entirely based on a state’s ability and willingness to
adequately implement them. Accordingly, while loan funds provided by the IFIs should serve to address a state’s delivery of
key political goods in the context of state failure, it is important
for the IFIs to consider the strength of such a state’s good gov263. See Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 260,
at 158.
264. See id.
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ernance policies. Similarly, although a state’s grant eligibility
should largely be based on its capacity to deliver political goods,
the international donor community must be provided with some
level of protection and assurance that these funds will be used
to fulfill the IFIs’ intended purposes. Good governance must
therefore remain an essential component of the IFIs’ financial
policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Restructuring the IFIs’ conditions to address terrorism raises
two important legal questions. First, whether such restructuring falls outside of the IFIs’ respective mandates and, second,
whether the IFIs can adequately address the issue when the
international community has not yet agreed upon a comprehensive multilateral convention.
Both questions can be answered in the affirmative. But the
most important question remains whether we can achieve the
necessary political consensus to support these changes. Although this Article does not purport to provide the ultimate solution to the eradication of terrorism, it does provide a method
through which the international community can help in preventing future attacks. As we have seen, the importance of setting such a regulatory framework cannot be underestimated.
The international donor community must therefore be committed to a long-term investment in the war on terrorism without
the expectation of immediate results.
As Abraham Lincoln once stated “you cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today.”265 Accordingly, if
nothing is done today to prevent tomorrow’s terrorist attacks,
we must be ready to accept collectively our responsibility for
failure to prevent such attacks from occurring.

265. Quoteland.com: All the Right Words, at http://www.quoteland.com/
author.asp?AUTHOR_ID=1042 (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).

